Biblical or heretical? It is quite an understatement to say that, since Smith returned from a private prayer in the woods near his home and announced that God had spoken to him, the doctrines he espoused have received mixed reactions. Smith's critics base their arguments against his views (and in favor of their own) upon biblical exegesis, creedal interpretation and philosophical analysis. On the other hand, Smith based the veracity of his views upon direct, personal revelation he claimed came from God. He was neither a philosopher nor a theologian per se, nor even a biblical scholar, although he oft en appealed to the Bible in support of his views. His controversial claim is epitomized by his declaration concerning "our condition and relationship to God": "Could you gaze into heaven fi ve minutes, you would know more than you would by reading all that ever was writt en on the subject." 4 While Smith claimed many such gazes, it is not our intent here to investigate whether or not such claims are true, and, in accordance with this purpose, we will present his revelations as he understood and presented them, rather than repeatedly referring to them as "purported" revelations. Instead, we will take as our point of departure one signifi cant area of resultant theology stemming from the visions Smith described:
5 what
Smith's theology has to say about trinitarian theorizing, a reemerging area of interest to Christian philosophers. Our purposes are fourfold: (1) to provide a general defense of "social trinitarianism" (hereaft er "ST") from some of the major objections raised against it; (2) to express (as clearly and fully as space permits) what we take to be Smith's understanding of the Trinity; 6 (3) to analyze the state of modern ST and (4) to argue that, as a form of ST, Smith's views contribute to the present discussion amongst proponents of ST.
I. Defense of ST
In order to set the stage for our upcoming discussion of ST it is necessary to fi rst establish its plausibility as an alternative to Latin trinitarianism (hereaft er "LT"). 7 This objective may partly be accomplished by defeating the foremost objections to it.
(A) Tritheism and Arianism as Heresies
John Gresham has outlined the four major criticisms leveled against ST as (1) The Terminological Criticism, (2) The Monotheistic Criticism, (3) The Christological Criticism and (4) The Feminist Criticism. 8 Gresham examines criticisms (1) and (4) and, because we believe that he shows their complete inadequacy, we will not comment further on either of these criticisms. However, in light of Brian Left ow's strong formulations of the "monotheistic criticism" and the "Christological criticism" we off er the following in response. 9 Left ow provides a succinct statement of the monotheistic criticism leveled against ST through what he calls the "hard tasks" for ST. According to Left ow, "one hard task for ST is to explain why its three Persons are 'not three Gods, but one God' and do so without transparently misreading the Creed." 10 This monotheistic criticism has also been expressed in terms of its corollary, namely, the accusation of tritheism. 11 Like many terms describing heresies, tritheism is oft en used with an apparent lack of understanding for its historical application. It is asserted by some that tritheism is simply the idea of three gods, no matt er how the idea is understood. For example, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen state, "What must be argued is that the three persons of the Trinity are only one God; in other words that they are one God only, and not in any sense also three Gods." 12 Others assert that tritheism is the idea of three diff erent Beings, each of whom "happens to be" divine. 13 In this rendering, tritheism consists of not appropriately expressing the unity among the beings.
Stephen Davis has asserted that the idea of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost actually constituting a society or community makes one a tritheist, whereas the idea that the relationship between Father, Son and Holy Ghost is in some ways like (or analogous to) a society or community allows one to avoid tritheism.
14 While all these accusations draw the boundary of heresy at diff erent points, they are all historically imprecise. As Cornelius Plantinga points out, the problem is not three distinct persons who may each properly be called "a God," (consider Thomas's statement to the resurrected Christ: "My Lord, my God"); the real problem is three ontologically graded gods.
In the fourth and fi ft h centuries, when the doctrine of the Trinity was being developed, there were particular limits on orthodoxy and, accordingly, particular positions outside orthodoxy. As already suggested, virtually everybody who writes on the Trinity during this period identifi es the monist heresy as some form of modalism, and then specifi es that modalism is unacceptable because it allows belief in only one person. I now want to add that the heresy on orthodoxy's pluralist side is specifi able as well. And it is surely not the view that God includes three distinct persons . . . what is heretical is belief in three ontologically graded distinct persons. 15 J. N. D. Kelly agrees that the pole of the tritheistic heresy was Arius who affi rmed that there is one God (the Father) who is unique, transcendent and indivisible, and whose being or essence cannot be shared or communicated. 16 Thus, the Son is a creature formed ex nihilo who cannot have any communion with or direct knowledge of the Father. It will simply not do then for critics of ST to maintain, with Left ow, that belief in three distinct beings amounts to the historical heresy of tritheism. ST and the precreedal Origen are "not afraid to speak in one sense of two Gods, in another sense of one God." 17 ST contends with Origen that the error of modalism lies in treating the Three as numerically indistinguishable and separable only in thought. As will be shown below, ST has no problem using the word "God" in diff erent ways.
Left ow's preoccupation with numerals is further illustrated by his comment, "A second hard task for ST is providing an account of what monotheism is which both is intuitively acceptable and lets ST count as monotheist."
18 In response, it fi rst ought to be pointed out that the word "monotheism" occurs nowhere in the Old or New Testaments. What occurs in the Christian scriptures is the assertion that "one" God rules in the heavens. We argue below that with the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as a person wholly divine yet distinct from the Father, this "one" can and should be understood in functional rather than numeric terms. ST contends that the relationship of Jesus and His God as portrayed in the New Testament is the key to understanding immanent trinitarian functions. William Hasker expresses this "crucial issue" in terms of a question:
Is the relationship between Jesus and the Father, as depicted in the Gospels, only the relationship of a man with his God, similar to that enjoyed by other men, though perhaps on a higher spiritual plane? Or is Jesus also "God, the Son of God," and was his relationship with the Father not only a relationship between a man and God-though it was that-but also the relationship, lived out on earth, between the eternal Son and his eternal Father-a relationship, in fact, between God and God? This is the question of all questions for the doctrine of the Trinity. 19 If this relationship is understood as between God and God, then adherence to so-called "strict Jewish monotheism" seems out of the question. Left ow's insistence that the Christian Godhead, "should be a monotheism a Jew could accept as monotheistic" is not only question-begging but also shows a lack of historical awareness and biblical scholarship. In particular, Jewish views were not uniform; there was a diversity of views about God and God's relation to the "sons of God" and other divine beings in Second Temple Judaism. Which Jews does Left ow have in mind? Jews of the Second Temple era like those who wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls and accepted an entire council of gods and divine beings like Michael? Modern Jews who reject the incarnation of the Son of God? First-century Jews, of whom Jesus said, "Ye neither know me, nor my Father"?
20 If premessianic Jews, is it preexilic Jews or postexilic Jews? If the response is "all of them," this proves extremely problematic. While space does not allow for full recapitulation of all the relevant studies in this area, scholars remain less than certain whether the religion of ancient Israel can even be called "monotheistic" and if it can, just how that is the case. 21 ST, and as will be shown, Joseph Smith, argue that monotheism should not be understood as a strictly numerical concept. The question of whether or not this rendering is "intuitive" must be left to the reader.
(B) Social Trinitarianism and the Creeds
If ST is biblical, which it seems to be, the question remains whether it can be creedal. As Left ow puts it, are proponents of ST "transparently misreading the Creed"? 22 To this, we answer no, for if scholarship has proved anything in relation to the terms used in the creeds, it is that they set the limits of orthodoxy very broadly and provide suffi cient room for a ST reading.
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While a full investigation into the doctrinal disputes of Nicaea is beyond the scope of this paper, it must be pointed out "that those who had signed the Nicene Creed could not agree on what it meant." 24 Consider the critical term of Nicaea, homoousios. Although not included in the fi rst draft of the creed, Constantine, the as-yet unbaptized emperor, requested its insertion. 25 In his comprehensive study of the term (and the idea of substance), Christopher Stead comments, Finally we have to consider the term homoousios as it occurs in the Nicene Creed; what were its immediate antecedents, and what was its meaning? These two questions have been repeatedly discussed, but without reaching assured conclusions.
There is, moreover, too litt le trustworthy evidence for the use of the term in the years immediately preceding Nicaea. Scholars have therefore had to rely, partly on certain broad historical projections, partly on the reports of the Council presented by Eusebius and Athanasius; of whom the former has come under suspicion as off ering a tendentious account of the proceedings, designed to excuse his reluctant subscription, while the latt er, whether or not he displays an opposing Tendenz, records his impressions of the Council aft er a lapse of twenty-fi ve years.
26
Stead then elucidates three possible ways in which homoousios could be viewed. 27 He concludes: "It is a thing," says Hilary, "equally deplorable and dangerous, that there are as many creeds as opinions among men, as many doctrines as inclinations, and as many sources of blasphemy as there are faults among us; because we make creeds arbitrarily, and explain them away as arbitrarily. The homoousion is rejected, and received, and explained away by successive synods. The partial or total resemblance of the Father and the Son is a subject of dispute for these unhappy times. Every year, nay, every moon, we make new creeds to describe invisible mysteries. We repent of what we have done, we defend those who repent, we anathematize those whom we have defended. We condemn either the doctrine of others in ourselves, or our own in that of others; and, reciprocally tearing one another to pieces, we have been the cause of each other's ruin." 31 If the originators and those who immediately followed could come to no consensus concerning the meaning of the creed, it is clear that modern Christians are not bound to a homogenous interpretation of it.
32 Proponents of ST (including Mormons) can accept the Nicene Creed as a declaration of the full divinity of Jesus Christ while rejecting the ontological identity of the three divine persons. This point is important and worth repeating: the Nicene Creed can be (and was historically) interpreted in varying ways, by varying groups, with varying theological commitments. Any number of persons, including modalists and proponents of ST, can subscribe to the creed, each producing its own studies to show why homoousios ought to be understood in a particular way.
The other technically critical words in trinitarian discourse, namely ousia and hypostasis, suff er from the same historical ambiguity as homoousios. 33 Consider Joseph Lienhard's hesitation to strictly defi ne these terms, "I do not off er a uniform translation of ousia and hypostasis. Such a refusal arises not only from cowardice, but also from the recognition of a fact: fourth-century authors themselves were wary of explaining the meaning of the two words, and generally resorted to comparisons rather than defi nitions." 34 As a result of this brief historical inquiry it is evident that the monotheistic criticism is in fact an issue of Arianism, which in turn is the Christological criticism. If ST is to avoid this criticism it must affi rm (1) that the Son is uncreate and eternal and (2) that the Son is fully God. Can it do so while remaining biblically faithful and internally consistent? We argue that it can and that Smith's ideas provide insight into many of the current issues surrounding ST as it tries to satisfy the above criteria. Before discussing what contributions Smith's thought provides to the ST debate, we fi rst turn to an explication of Smith's trinitarian model, a model we shall call "Elyonic Monotheism."
II. Smith's View of the Godhead (A) Three Distinct Divine Persons or "Three Gods"
In 1842, as part of a response to a Chicago newspaperman's inquiry as to what "Mormons" believed, Joseph Smith penned thirteen basic beliefs, which have come to be known as "The Articles of Faith." Though not intended as such, they remain the closest Mormon analog to a creed. The fi rst of these articles affi rms belief in the New Testament Godhead: "We believe in God, the Eternal Father, and in His Son, Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Ghost." 35 Thus, this fi rst Article of Faith identifi es a trinitarian Godhead, though it does so without declaring how the members of the Godhead relate to one another. However, as if to underscore the significance accorded the question by addressing it through the fi rst Article of Faith, numerous other revelations, writings, and speeches speak to the issues of both unity and distinctness within the Trinity. Clearly, this was an issue about which Smith had much to say.
In his last public sermon prior to his death, Smith declared, I have always and in all congregations when I have preached on the subject of the Deity, it has been the plurality of Gods. . . . I have always declared God to be a distinct personage, Jesus Christ a separate and distinct personage from God the Father, and that the Holy Ghost was a distinct personage and a Spirit: and these three constitute three distinct personages and three Gods. 36 This affi rmation was also based upon revelation. Of such, Smith wrote: "Any person that had seen the heavens opened knows that there are three personages in the heavens who hold the keys of power, and one presides over all." 37 Smith understood the power held by these three persons to be supreme power (including supreme creative power, ruling power, and redeeming power).
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Note that Smith did not teach that the Godhead was three diff erent modes or manifestations of the same person or being. 39 Nor did he suggest that the Godhead was in some way merely like or analogous to three persons; he taught that it actually consists of three distinct persons. While all trinitarians maintain there are three divine persons in some sense, Smith distinguishes them with particular force and clarity. For Smith, each of these persons is uncreate and self-existent. 40 This is an important point and bears some elaboration. For Smith, at any time t the existence of each of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost is an unchanging fact about the universe. None depends upon the others for his existence, nor could one annihilate either of the others. In this sense, we could say that the divine persons are "ontologically independent." This point will be further developed below, in comparison with other formulations of ST. In addition to metaphysical necessity and self-existence, Smith's revelations depict each divine person as possessing his own mind, or center of consciousness. For instance, consider this portrayal of the Son's postresurrection pleading (or interceding) with the Father:
Listen to him who is the Advocate with the Father, who is pleading your case before him: Saying Father behold the suff ering and death of him who did no sin, in whom thou wast well pleased; behold the blood of thy Son which was shed, the blood of him whom thou gavest that thyself might be glorifi ed: wherefore Father spare these my brethren that believe on my name, that they may come unto me and have everlasting life.
41
"Him," "thou," "thy," "thyself," "my," "me": such language is abundant in Smith's revelations, portraying interactive relations between the Father and the Son. Smith taught that the mind, speech and actions of both the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct from the Father's mind, speech and actions. Furthermore, according to Smith, each of the three possesses his own will. The Book of Mormon implores readers to "choose eternal life, according to the will" of the Holy Spirit. 42 The Doctrine and Covenants discloses Jesus' agony in Gethsemane and distinguishes between his will and that of the Father. 43 However, while it is clear that the Holy Ghost and the Son each possess their own distinct will, as shall be discussed below, it is the Father's will that they seek to accomplish. Thus, in another revelation Christ proclaims, "I am Jesus Christ; I came by the will of the Father, and I do his will," and in relation to the His atoning sacrifi ce, He declares, "I . . . accomplished and fi nished the will of him whose I am, even the Father." 44 Further evidence of Smith's strong notion of the distinct personhood of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is found in his portrayal of each as being profoundly passible. The Son experiences emotions distinct from those of the Father, while the Father experiences emotions distinct from those of the Son. 45 In bodily form, each resembles the manifestation of Jesus incarnate, both in his mortal and glorifi ed resurrected bodily states. 46 For Smith, there are literally three distinct divine persons-or, as he boldly chose to say near the end of his life, "three Gods." Each of these persons is independently self-existent and each possesses his own distinct center of consciousness, will and emotions. For Smith, the proposition that there are three distinct persons in the Godhead appears to express a nonnegotiable fact, with which any acceptable account of the unity of the Godhead would have to cohere.
(B) Smith's Views: One God
Notwithstanding his explicit declaration that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three distinct personages and three Gods," Smith's revelations also repeatedly affi rm that "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are one God."
47 At face value, these two affi rmations appear to be fl atly contradictory. 48 However, closer inspection discloses that the contradiction is apparent only, resulting from Smith's equivocal use of the term "God." It is therefore important to briefl y examine what Smith meant by the term "one God," and show how these statements, when correctly understood, are actually consistent with his affi rmation of three distinct divine persons, or "three Gods."
One critic of ST has writt en, "The Trinity is an illogical paradox if the three-in-oneness it refers to is conceived in the terms of mathematical logic, that is, if the concept of the oneness of the Trinity is understood primarily as a strictly mathematical number 1."
49 Smith obviously did not understand biblical oneness scriptures as asserting numerical unity. For instance, in interpreting an oft -quoted oneness passage, Smith says, "I want to read the text to you myself [John 17:21]-'I am agreed with the Father and the Father is agreed with me, and we are agreed as one. ' The Greek shows that it should be agreed."
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Rather than understanding their oneness as an identity of being, Smith saw the oneness of the Godhead as, amongst other things, a unity in heart, mind, will, att ributes and nature. Smith understood this unity to be a result of the willing and free choice of the divine persons to align their distinct wills. Indeed, Smith specifi cally taught that an "everlasting covenant was made between three personages [Father, Son and Holy Ghost] before the organization of this earth, and relates to their dispensation of things to men on the earth."
51 Smith understood this covenant to consist of each of the three divine beings covenanting with the others to fulfi ll a specifi c role in relation to the salvation of the human family. The Father, according to Smith, is God "the fi rst" 52 and presides "over all," 53 and it is the Father's plan of creation and redemption that the Son carries out. 54 Thus, Smith refers to the Son as God "the second" and as "the Redeemer" and "the Mediator." 55 According to Smith, God "the third," or Holy Ghost, is "the witness or Testator." 56 Because of their covenant relationship, a synergetic bond exists between the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the nature of which is distinctive to the Trinity. This bond was forged not only out of their oneness of minds, hearts, natures and att ributes, but also out of their interdependent missions.
In a sermon, Smith asked, "What did Jesus do?" and provided a paraphrased answer: "Why, I do the things I saw my Father do . . . when I get my kingdom, I shall present it to My Father, so that He may obtain kingdom upon kingdom, and it will exalt Him in glory." 57 Meanwhile, as Jesus performed the roles of a savior and redeemer of the Father's creations, Smith viewed the Holy Ghost as a person charged with yet another distinct mission, a portion of which he elucidated in an editorial:
We believe that the holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and that holy men in these days speak by the same principle; we believe in its being a comforter and a witness bearer, that it brings things past to our remembrance, leads us into all truth, and shows us of things to come; we believe that 'no man can know that Jesus is the Christ, but by the Holy Ghost.' 58 Thus, as the Father needs the Son and Holy Ghost to accomplish his purposes, so do the Son and Holy Ghost need and look to the Father for direction, power and exaltation. By their acts of mutual service, each fulfi lls, and is fulfi lled in, the others. The Book of Mormon declares this unity of will to be complete by saying of Jesus Christ, "Yea, even so he shall be led, crucifi ed, and slain, the fl esh becoming subject even unto death, the will of the Son being swallowed up in the will of the Father." 59 In explaining this passage, LDS philosopher Blake Ostler observes:
There is only one God because the will of the Son is "swallowed up" in the will of the Father. There are clearly two wills, for the Son has a will that is distinct from the Father's will, but he willingly subordinates his will to the Father's will so that only one will is actually expressed in the divine relationship, i.e., the Father's. In this sense, by completely subordinating his will to the Father's will it follows that the Father's will is always realized and thus the one God is, in this sense, both the Father and the Son. 60 Thus, while the Son and Holy Ghost possess distinct minds and wills and exhibit distinct actions, the Godhead thinks, wills and acts ad extra as one. This is shown explicitly in Jesus' pre-incarnate declaration in the Book of Mormon: "Behold, I come unto my own . . . to do the will, both of the Father and of the Son." 61 As explained above, it is the will of the Father that the Son and Holy Ghost freely take as their own. This loving and free choice of the divine persons to align their wills is expressed in Smith's revelations through the assertions that there is only one doctrine, 62 judgment, 63 baptism 64 and record 65 of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Again, as Smith declared, "Any person that had seen the heavens opened knows that there are three personages in the heavens who hold the keys of power, and one [the Father] presides over all."
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Along with explaining the concept of "one God" as relating to a unity of will, Smith also taught that there is "one God" in the sense of only one type of "God-nature" or set of att ributes, severally necessary and jointly suffi cient, for divinity. We believe that the late Latt er-day Saint Apostle Elder James E. Talmage provides a clear explanation of how the possession of a qualitatively indistinguishable set of characteristics makes the Godhead "one":
This unity is a type of completeness; the mind of any one member of the Trinity is the mind of the others; seeing as each of them does with the eye of perfection, they see and understand alike. Under any given conditions each would act in the same way, guided by the same principles of unerring justice and equity. 67 While the divine nature includes maximal power, knowledge, justice and mercy, Smith understood "the greatest of all" to be love: namely, each God is God ultimately because He possesses maximal love. 68 As will be developed more fully below, Smith's view of love as "one of the chief characteristics of Deity" is key to understanding the type of "triunity" he described. 69 For Smith, then, the unity of the Godhead does not reduce to logical necessity, but instead rests most fundamentally in the binding power of love. 70 Finally, Smith viewed the biblical designation of Jesus as "the Son of the living God" 71 as much more than an "analogy" of the genetic relationship that would naturally exist between a father and son. The leadership of the LDS Church issued a doctrinal exposition (based on Smith's teachings) that states: "[God] is literally the Father of the spirit of Jesus Christ and also of the body in which Jesus Christ performed His mission in the fl esh."
72 Thus, not only are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost to be considered "one God" in terms of will, purpose and nature but are also linked through a very literal familial relationship. 73 What has been said concerning Smith's understanding of the unity of the Godhead may be summarized as follows: The persons of the Trinity are united as one God (a) through a foundation of profound and abiding love, (b) in their familial relationships, (c) in an "everlasting covenant" that unites their activity and wills and (d) in "the same fullness" of divine att ributes.
To repeat a very important point: in Smith's revelations and discourses, the word "God" is used equivocally to designate, amongst other things, each individual divine person (but especially the Father), the perfectly united divine community, and the divine nature. To avoid misunderstanding while reading Mormon texts, it is imperative to keep these multiple uses of the word "God" in mind.
74 Consistent with his revelations, when Smith declares there are "three Gods," he means that there are three individual persons, each of whom is divine. When he affi rms that there is "one God," he means that either there is one God the Father, one perfectly united divine community or one generic divine nature. 75 
III. Contemporary Social Trinitarianism: Agreement
The revival of ST has been described as "one of the most signifi cant developments in contemporary theology." 76 Along with this revival has come a certain amount of confusion concerning what exactly qualifi es as a social model of the Trinity. Indeed, a wide variety of views of the Trinity, which contradict each other at crucial points, all lay claim to the social model. This in turn has caused even greater confusion, as critics provide arguments directed at a specifi c form of ST which may have no application to other forms. 77 While all who affi rm ST agree on a few key issues, there remains much work to be done in the refi nement and working-out of any version of ST.
Perhaps what is most agreed upon by proponents of ST is the inadequacy of so-called Western theology's att empts at explicating the doctrine of the Trinity. In contrast to Western theology's beginning with the one essence, the oft -quoted explanation of ST is that it begins with the three persons. This methodological departure from the norm forms a basic, and most simple, defi nition of ST. As Jürgen Moltmann explains, "we are beginning with the Trinity of the Persons and shall then go on to ask about the unity." 78 This much is consistent in all models of ST. 
IV. Current Issues in ST and Smith's Contributions (A) Internal Consistency
In his watershed and lucid treatment of ST, Cornelius Plantinga presents a biblically faithful and internally consistent model that sets the standard for future theorizing. For Plantinga, the "one what?" question in the Trinity is answered in three specifi c ways. There is "only one font of divinity, only one Father, only one God in that sense of God," 83 there is "only one divine essence or set of excellent properties severally necessary and jointly suffi cient for their possessor to be divine," and there is "only one divine family or monarchy or community, namely, the Holy Trinity itself." 84 Other theologians have sought to answer the "one what?" question with varying levels of success. Despite their insistence on the real and distinct personhood of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, many of these versions of ST fall prey to the traditional trinitarian habit of taking back with one hand what they have just given with the other. For example, some versions of ST assert that while Father, Son and Spirit are divine, only the Trinity is most appropriately God. 85 These models have been labeled "Trinity Monotheism"
86 by Left ow, a fi tt ing description because for them only one thing is most appropriately God, namely the Trinity itself. While this approach saves the numerical unity of the three, it clearly violates what for ST and Christianity is fundamental, namely, that each person of the Trinity is fully God. This defect, in our judgment, certainly disqualifi es it as a strong or social model of the Godhead.
Other models, which Left ow calls "Group Mind Monotheism," 87 place the unity of the Trinity in a shared mind. "Group Mind" monotheism asserts that the three divine Persons have but one mind between them, which is God or the mind of the one God, or that they comprise a fourth divine mind. 88 Even if intelligible, this approach quite clearly rules out any real distinctness of the trinitarian persons.
Another example of a less-than-adequate att empt to develop an internally consistent version of ST is that of William Hasker. Throughout his paper "Tri-Unity," Hasker does an admirable job developing "a reconstruction of the doctrine of the Trinity developed in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind." 90 In so doing he defi nes a person's nature as a specifi cation of "a set of characteristics which together delimit the range of [a person's] actual and possible experiences within the fi eld of all possible experiences."
91 Thus, Hasker continues,
If we agree to call the continuing characteristics of a given individual his 'dispositions,' then his nature is the ontological ground of the dispositions. Or to put it diff erently, the nature is that in virtue of which the self is able to have experiences of various kinds; it is the real capacity or the real potentiality for having such experiences. Or again, the self as subject is that which acts or has experiences; its nature is that by which it does so.
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In a footnote, Hasker points out the obvious in regards to the nature of a person being a universal or particular: "it should be clear that natures, as here defi ned are particular rather than universal; each individual person has his own distinct nature. (There is, however, no logical reason why two persons might not have natures which are qualitatively indistinguishable.)"
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So far, Hasker's account is both illuminating and seemingly helpful. However, it is in his application to the persons of the Trinity that Hasker's thesis seemingly falls into incoherence. In explaining what he takes to be one about the Godhead Hasker asserts, "The doctrine of the Trinity, stated in these terms, means that the one individual and indivisible Nature of God is possessed by three Subjects, each of whom is really distinct from the other two." 94 Hasker's apparent contradiction can be stated in formal terms, for he asserts:
(1) Natures are particulars, that is, "each individual person has his own distinct nature." This of course has been answered in classical trinitarianism by saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit 'proceed' from the Father-but that is another story." 98 Unless this story is told in a logically satisfying way, Hasker's model remains internally inconsistent. There is of course a way out for Hasker, and that is to admit that the persons of the Trinity each possess a distinct nature, but assert that these natures are, in his words, "qualitatively indistinguishable." Hasker's att empt seems to be one of trying to maintain some sort of ontological oneness, and such endeavors are, of course, nothing new.
(B) Biblical Correspondence
While the tendency to affi rm some sort of ontological oneness within the Trinity has been the dominant tradition in the West since some time aft er Nicaea, 99 we maintain, with Smith, that any such att empts cannot do justice to the Biblical witness of Jesus' physical resurrection.
As a modern witness to the historically indispensable doctrine of the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, Smith's witness presses this Christological issue into the trinitarian discussion. Smith oft en accused sectarian ministers of trying to "stuff " the Father, Son and Holy Ghost into "one body." 100 While seemingly naïve, Smith's point can be stated in more sophisticated terms, bringing the issue into focus. Smith believed, based upon the Bible and personal experience, that Jesus currently possesses a resurrected body complete with "fl esh and bones." 101 This body is his and not God the Father's. If the question is one of "counting God," then this resurrected body must be counted or, at least, accounted for.
We have noticed, in the academic arena, a lack of integration between the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of God the Son 102 and theological models of the Trinity. For example, William Alston says, "The basic trouble is that it simply does not seem at all appropriate to think of incorporeal persons being constituted of any material or stuff ." 103 Furthermore, Keith Yandell asserts, "By nature, God is not located in space. . . . Hence one cannot distinguish between one trinitarian member and another by reference to spatial properties (God has none)." 104 No explanation is given as to why the Son, aft er affi rming his bodily resurrection to many, is now incorporeal or lacks spatial properties. Did Jesus leave his resurrected body? The biblical witness seems to condemn this idea, for as James says, "the body without the spirit is dead," 105 and according to Paul's testimony, "Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once: but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God." 106 To remain consistent with the biblical witness Christian theologians must maintain a Son whose spirit possesses a distinct physical body. As argued above, it seems that Jesus' spirit, once reunited with his body through resurrection will not and cannot be separated from his body. If Jesus' body is not the Father's body and Jesus' spirit will forever inhabit his body, it seemingly follows that the Father and the Son are not one identical Spirit. Thus, if Christianity maintains (as it has historically) that God is a Spirit, then the Spirit of the Father must be distinguishable from that of the Son because one inhabits a body eternally that the other does not. For adherents of ST, the resurrected Son seems to necessitate the real ontological distinctness of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Indeed, any att empt to identify the oneness of the Trinity through ontology seems incoherent in the face of Jesus' physical resurrection. Furthermore, the reality of the resurrection seems to pose a problem for the LT who deplores counting more than one numerical God. The possession of a corporeal body by the Son seems to preclude the persons being diff erentiated by "relationship" or "name" only.
Perhaps it may be responded that, since it is well accepted in Western Christianity that Christ was both fully human and fully divine, Christ's embodiment can be an aspect of only his human nature and not his divine nature. Thus, since the Father and the Son share only the same divine nature and not the human nature, Christ can have a resurrected body and the divine nature without the Father sharing His body. 107 We believe that this response fails on several grounds: fi rst, it fails to respond to the fact that, while incarnate, Jesus was fully God in that His human nature and His divine nature resided in a physical body, thus leaving the problem of the Father's spirit's location unresolved. Moreover, the biblical record clearly indicates that Jesus' body was itself divine in the sense that it is "spiritual" and "glorious" (1 Cor. 15:44; Philip. 3:21); why would Jesus' divine nature not reside in His resurrected, spiritual and glorious body in a way that proves problematic to the supposed numeric identity of the Father and Son? Finally, the radical separation of the human nature from the divine nature needed for this argument tends too readily toward Nestorianism, the belief that two persons, one human and one divine, are embodied in Christ.
With the failure of this att empted resolution, other responses suggest themselves. Perhaps the fact that spatial predicates apply to the Son but not the Father can simply be understood in a similar fashion to other predicates. Traditional theology has no particular problem with statements like "The Son, not the Father, is the Redeemer," as it relates to the specifi c, differentiated roles of members of the Trinity. Since having a body is essential to the Son's mission, and only to the Son's mission, the predicates relating to His body do not need to apply to the Father any more than other such predicates. Again, this response comes up short. Above all, it enters dense philosophical woods by claiming that numerically identical beings can have diff erent properties. It also seems to trivialize the Son's resurrected body by consigning it a solely functional purpose. While it may be the case that a body is necessary in order to suff er and die for mankind, it seems much less the case that having a body is necessary for overcoming death and being eternally glorifi ed. Why, then, on this view, did Jesus keep his body? Why do we keep our bodies? The Son's body is not simply related to His earthly mission, and thus this response fails.
Finally, the respondent may att empt to argue that it is in some sense true that the Father and the Son share a body, perhaps in the sense of which the Bible speaks of the unity between husband and wife. Perhaps a theory like this could allude to scriptures like Col. 2:9, "For in him dwelleth the fullness of the Godhead bodily." Thus, as the husband's body is in some sense the wife's, Christ's body is in some sense the Father's, removing the obstacle. Again, though, the response misfi res. We can't fully say that the Son's body is the Father's, which we seem required to do in order to escape the problems caused by numerical identity. If we can fully say that the Son's body is the Father's, then it is diffi cult to see how we can avoid patripassianism or, in Joseph Smith's words, "stuffi ng" the Father, Son and Holy Ghost into one body. Since both of these are unacceptable to traditional theology, this response comes up short. Another account of the relationship between the resurrected Son and the Father is in order.
Taking adequate account of the resurrected Son can help future ST models adhere to what Cornelius Plantinga calls the minimum "three conditions" that a model must meet to qualify as "a strong or social theory of the Trinity":
(1) The theory must have Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and action. Since each of these capacities requires consciousness, it follows that, on this sort of theory, Father, Son, and Spirit would be viewed as distinct centers of consciousness or, in short, as persons in some full sense of that term. (2) Any accompanying sub-theory of divine simplicity must be modest enough to be consistent with condition (1), that is, with the real distinctness of trinitarian persons. And (3) Father, Son, and Spirit must be regarded as tightly enough related to each other so as to render plausible the judgment that they constitute a particular social unit. 108 We argue that these three conditions provide a suitable and necessary measuring rod for all theologians seeking to develop a legitimate social model of the Trinity. However, biblical correspondence and internal consistency and, more particularly, integration with Christ's bodily resurrection are not the only obstacles that ST is presently seeking to overcome. Two other issues prominent in ST discourse are those of division of power and the perichoretic indwelling of the trinitarian persons. We assert that Smith's teachings come to bear on both these issues where ST currently lack consensus.
(C) Power and Decision Making
If the persons of the Trinity are allowed their real personhood and divinity and therefore real distinctness, many theologians have been concerned with how characteristics entailed by their divinity are shared. 109 The conventional proposal for such an unsharable characteristic is omnipotence. Two theologians who have dealt with this issue at length are Richard Swinburne and Timothy Bartel. Both are concerned with the possibility of a confl ict of wills or even a "permanent creative stalemate" 110 between the persons of the Trinity.
While a full critique of their positions lies outside the scope of this paper, 111 a few comments are in order to clarify the issues of power and love in the Trinity. Both assert that in order to rule out a confl ict of wills between the three omnipotent beings, each person of the Trinity must agree upon some sort of decision-sharing proposal. 112 In resolving this issue, Swinburne argues for a form of "monarchism" arising out of the Son and Holy Ghost's ontological dependence upon the Father. 113 Coined by the Cappodocians, "monarchism" expresses the view that the Father is the "sole source or sole origin" (Greek "monarchē") of the Son and the Spirit. 114 Swinburne suggests that with the Father's necessary creation of the Son and Holy Spirit came a decision-sharing proposal:
Such unity of action could be secured if the fi rst God [i.e., the Father] solemnly vows to the second God [the Son] in creating him that he will not frustrate any action of his in a certain sphere of activity, and expresses the request that in return the second God should not frustrate any action of his in the other sphere. 115 Bartel, on the other hand, rejects monarchism of any kind on the reasoning that, "On any natural reading," monarchism commits us to the inferiority of the Son and the Spirit, and that if the Social Trinitarian wants her position to be coherent, she ought to hold that none of the members of the Trinity depends for his existence on any of the others-a view that also lacks a convenient label, but which I propose we should call "republicanism." 116 Bartel's republicanism is of itself not strictly worked out, but he does off er three decision-sharing scenarios that would allow the Trinity to resolve a confl ict of wills. The underlying premise of Bartel's proposals is the complete equality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit such that each person of the Trinity may (and presumably does) "table decision-sharing proposals." 117 The intent of Bartel's proposals is a unity of will and power such that only one will and power are realized and of course only one will is recognizable in divine history. This is equivalent to what Left ow labels "functional monotheism."
118 Despite its democratic appeal, Bartel admits an uneasiness of abandoning all notions of the supremacy of the Father.
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Which of these, if either, ought the proponent of ST adopt? We argue that while well-intentioned and logically plausible, neither Bartel's nor Swinburne's model does full justice to biblical revelation. In connection with this claim, we argue that Smith's model for decision making and power sharing is more biblically consistent and ought to be adopted.
As stated above, Smith explicitly endorses Bartel's "republicanism" in that, according to Smith's revelations, none of the Persons of the Godhead depend on the others for their existence. Moreover, while the Father, Son and Holy Ghost each possess their own distinct will, it is the Father's will that each seek to accomplish. This view, we argue, is more in line with the Bible. While the idea of such a functional subordination without inequality in being is not novel, where Smith's theology supersedes previous explanations of divine power sharing is in the why of the submission. Smith's affi rmation that the Son and Holy Ghost submit to will of the Father purely out of love is an important addition. As will be more fully explicated below, Smith conceived of love as the most "Godlike" att ribute. We believe that Christian theology has been unduly infl uenced by the idea that power ought to be understood as coercive power.
120 Contrastingly, Smith taught that "the powers of heaven . . . can or ought to be maintained . . . only by persuasion, by long-suff ering, by gentleness and meekness and by love unfeigned." 121 The power and decisionmaking of the Father is that of love, not of coercion. No person in the Godhead would do anything to contravene the freedom of another. Out of love for the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost entered before creation into an "everlasting covenant" 122 to freely submit to the Father's will. What has been said above concerning Smith's view of the immanent trinitarian functions may be summarized in four points:
(1) The Father is the loving head of the Trinity such that he "presides over all."
(2) Love induces and maintains the operational or functional subordination of the Son and Holy Ghost to the Father.
(3) The Son and Holy Ghost are self-existent and, therefore, have ontological equality with the Father.
(4) As a result of (1) and (2), (i) only one will is realized and acted upon in salvation history and (ii) it is the will of the Father.
As stated above, we call Smith's understanding of divine decision making "Elyonic Monotheism." There is but one "Most High God," the Father, 123 who is loved and obeyed by the Son and Holy Ghost. As set forth "Elyonic Monotheism" is a species of the genus "functional monotheism" and is, we argue, biblically consistent and rationally persuasive.
(D) Perichoresis and Trinitarian "Glue"
Another ST concept yet to be fully worked out is that of the divine indwelling, or perichoresis. 124 The issue arises out of passages such as John 10:38, wherein Jesus asserts, "The Father is in me and I am in the Father."
125 Once again, while full discussion of the issue lies beyond the scope of this paper, a few comments are in order. Some proponents of ST seem to take this perichoretic unity as asserting (1) some sort of logically necessary unity or (2) some sort of ontological mixing of the persons. We assert that neither (1) nor (2) is appropriate and that once again Smith's insights come to bear on the issue.
In regards to (1) consider how St. John Damascene, apparently the fi rst person to use the term, illustrates it:
The remaining and residing of one in the other of the three Persons means that they are inseparable and cannot be parted but have among themselves a compenetration without confusion, not in such a way that they themselves are dissolved in one another or mixed together but in such a way that they are joined. . . . One and identical is the movement because the impetus and the dynamism of the three persons is one, something which is not found in created nature. 126 In the contemporary ST debate, this idea of the metaphysical necessity of the perichoretic unity is upheld by many, including Cornelius Plantinga. For Plantinga, the "patreity, fi leity and spireity" entail the essential relatedness of the three persons. Through these relations the persons of the Trinity are bound "in unbreakable bonds" which are both "eternal" and "metaphysical." 127 We have, up to this point, been in agreement with Plantinga's model; however, we cannot follow him on this issue. We suggest that Smith's insight concerning the nature of love itself must play a central role in conceiving of the unity of the Godhead.
As stated above, Smith understood the will of intelligent beings to be inherently, libertarianly free and viewed love as the defi ning characteristic of deity. These two fundamental commitments lead to Smith's conclusion that even friendship amongst "intelligent beings" "must arise from love, and that love grows out of virtue." 128 Surely it is an understatement to say that the persons of the Godhead are friends, but this principle is easily extrapolated to Smith's view of the unity of the Godhead, where each divine person is indeed an intelligent being. The unity that is maintained cannot be one of coercion of any type, nor can it be simply a matt er of necessity. Instead, any and all unity within the Godhead must principally arise and be maintained through freely given and freely reciprocated love. 129 In this view, the binding power of love guarantees the eternal unity of the Trinity rather than some mode of logical or metaphysical necessity. If the persons of the Trinity are bound either logically or metaphysically, then their unity is necessary. However, necessary unity is incompatible with divine free will and makes the divine love a hollow form of self-love.
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For "other-love" to obtain, two conditions are necessary. First, the other must truly be other. If the very being of one is tied to (or identical with) another, they cannot be truly other to each other. The second necessary condition for "other-love" is the possibility (logically at least) of one saying "no" to the other. In other words, if one posits divine persons that are free, then it is not compossible to also assert necessary unity between the three. 131 Of course, it might be argued that such a model allows for the logical possibility of a split amongst the Persons of the Trinity. In other words, in Smith's model it is logically possible that one member of the Trinity could oppose the other's plans. Some may see this as a defi ciency. However, we argue that the utility gained by positing free divine persons outweighs this logically possible but practically impossible scenario of divine rebellion.
In regards to (2) or the actual elucidation of the perichoretic unity, we agree with Dale Tuggy's critique:
More to the point are dark assertions about the periochoresis or "coinherence" or "mutual permeation" (etc.) of the three divine persons. The point of these claims, I take it, is that the three persons are somehow ontologically, or metaphysically, and not just relationally "mixed together." This kind of periochoresis-talk seems fi rmly stuck at the metaphorical level. . . . It appears that there is no way to "cash out" this metaphor into literal assertion, and that no-one can say why the metaphor is appropriate.
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Tuggy's criticism is ironically validated by those who assert, "the Father and the Son mutually indwell one another, and the Holy Spirit, in an ontological sense which can never be true of man." 133 While many LDS-specifi c scriptures assert the "indwelling" of the Persons of the Trinity, 134 on this issue, Smith's insights serve as a limit to trinitarian theorizing. The logic of real love precludes understanding perichoresis in terms of an ontological unity.
Smith's revelations further limit trinitarian theorizing by their insistence that any talk of trinitarian co-inherence must be informed by Jesus' prayer-promise, "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us. . . . And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one."
135 Thus, perichoretic unity claims must be consistent with Jesus' promise that the same kind of indwelling which occurs among the members of the Godhead may be achieved by all worthy Christians.
Like other Greek interpolations, perichoresis can be an ambiguous word. While many use the term, there remains no consensus concerning its meaning. 136 Smith realized that an essential property of divinity is a relationship of sacred and intimate unity with the persons of the Godhead. For example, in an 1833 revelation Smith records this perichoretictype passage: 
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One of the distinctive theological ideas Smith espoused was this strong notion of theosis, wherein all persons are invited to partake of the same unity that currently obtains between the Godhead. A social model of the Trinity provides a coherent conception of the divine unity which in turn provides ordinary Christians with an understandable hope for a future unity based on the love exhibited between the members of the Godhead. Even critics of ST admit that "This interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity [ST] is commendable to the extent that it depends upon the fundamental insight that God is love, and love is something that God wishes people to share without condition amongst themselves."
139 To this, Smith adds the declaration that God is love and wishes people to share in the same love and relationship that currently obtains between the persons of the Trinity.
Smith's conception of the Godhead is thus an especially robust form of ST, deeply informed by his view of love as the foremost att ribute of God. It clearly distinguishes three divine beings while giving an internally consistent and biblically faithful account of their unity in power and decision, and in perichoresis. It explains the sharing of power and decision making by recognizing the Father as fount of divinity, distinct in role but freely sharing the fullness of divinity with the Son and Holy Ghost. It explains perichoresis not through ontology, but as free and intimate cooperation, based on love, and hence communicable to all who are willing to fully participate in this love.
V. Conclusion
This paper was an att empt to compare, contrast and involve the beliefs of Joseph Smith with the thoughtful and well-articulated views of modern trinitarians. In so doing we have defended ST from its theological critics and argued that Joseph Smith's understanding of the Trinity throws needed light on several of the contemporary issues surrounding ST. We maintain that incorporating these insights into the ongoing trinitarian discussion can help combat what many commentators see as "the current situation in which we fi nd ourselves, namely, the virtually total irrelevance of the doctrine of the Trinity."
140 Surely this is a batt le worth fi ghting. 5. The major compilations of revelations which came to or through Smith, all of which will be referenced in this paper, include the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine and Covenants (hereaft er D&C, designated by section and verse) and the Pearl of Great Price (includes the Book of Abraham and the Book of Moses). These are widely available through the church's Web site, htt p://www .lds.org (select "order Church materials," then select "scriptures" on the side bar to view the various options available). A "triple combination" contains the Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants, and Pearl of Great Price. The full text may also be browsed at htt p://www.scriptures.lds.org.
6. Latt er-day Saints use the terms "Godhead" and "Trinity" interchangeably in referring to the three divine persons, though they use the former term much more frequently.
7. In this essay we adopt the usual explanation that Latin/Western Trinitarianism (LT) begins from the oneness (usually construed as numerical oneness) of God and tries to explain how one God can nonetheless be three divine Persons. While this distinction is useful for our purposes, Fred Sanders's observation concerning oversimplifi cation bears repeating, "the most irritating oversimplifi cation is probably the rule of thumb, which somehow has become ubiquitous even at the popular level, that Eastern trinitarian thought begins with the three persons while Western trinitarian thought begins with the one essence. Anybody who has tried to engage a few of the church fathers closely has probably experienced the disjunction between that organizing schema and the kind of arguments and idioms actually found in the texts." 27.
(1) The fi rst possibility amounts to saying that the so-called two or more things are actually one and the same. (2) Two or more beings could be called "homoousios" because there is one single ousia to which they belong, and of which they are aspects, parts, or expression. Thus three divine Persons might be described by the term homoousios as belonging to a single complex ousia which needs the three distinct Persons for its full expression. (3) The term "homoousios" could be applied to two or more beings because they severally have (and not 'jointly constitute') a single ousia; that is, if they have the same generic or specifi c characteristics, or the same material constitution. Thus the term "homoousios," used of angels, might suggest that they all belonged to the same glorious company; used of stones, it might rather suggest that they share those features which inseparably att ach to stones, in being inanimate, heavy, and hard.
28 33. The "Cappadocian sett lement" expressed in the oft -quoted formula, "one ousia and three hypostaseis," is frequently presented as one that was accepted with enthusiasm and widely employed. But the exact formula is, in fact, more a piece of modern academic shorthand than a quotation from the writings of the Cappadocians. In the short form just quoted, the formula is rarely found in their writings. divine and human natures of Christ "coinhere in one another without the integrity of either being diminished by the presence of the other." However, it seems that St. John Damascene was the fi rst to use the term in regards to the trinity. See main text above. Perhaps the most quoted on the topic is Hilary of Poitiers who asserts that the concept is one "which the wit of man will never solve, nor will human research ever fi nd an analogy for." Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, 3.1 (available at htt p://www.newadvent.org/fathers/330203.htm. No translator listed.) Others, including Plantinga don't use the word "perichoresis" at all but do talk of "the mysterious in-ness or oneness relation in the divine life" and interpret that as "short of personal identity, but much closer than mere common membership in a class. For it includes a divine kinship relation as well. 
